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I. INTRODUCTION
Public safety radio communication provides the essential link by
which fire, police, emergency medical services ("EMS"), and other
emergency personnel respond to life- and property-threatening situations.
Communications enables the situational awareness, command, and
operational control without which the response of multiple agencies to an
emergency is less than useless. Key to this communications capability is
interoperability: the capability of first responders from different agencies to
communicate during emergencies.
The lack of interoperability in high-profile emergencies has
highlighted public discussion of the issue, creating political pressure in
Washington to "do something." These events include the first World Trade
Center bombing in 1993, the Oklahoma City bombing of the Murrah
Building in 1995, the Columbine High School killings in 1999, the collapse
of the World Trade Center towers in 2001, and more recently, Hurricane
Katrina in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama in 2005. In each case,
horror stories about the lack of communications among responding
agencies leading to confused and ineffective responses to these disasters
flooded the press. And yet, over a decade has passed and apparently little
progress has been made in achieving the goal of interoperability.
This Article addresses the paradox of interoperability. While federal
agencies establish programs and studies, exchange memos, and hold
conferences such as this to little effect, there are states that have solved the
interoperability problem and have stable, longstanding systems that provide
emergency voice communications on demand among cooperating agencies,
even across state lines. While existing radio systems are far from perfect
and no doubt need to be updated and expanded for tomorrow's needs,
interoperability can be achieved and has been achieved by a number of
states, some of whose systems have been in place for over a decade with
quite satisfactory results. What explains this paradox of feverish federal
activity with little to show for it, while at the same time some states simply
get the job done, paying little attention to the alarums and excursions
emanating from Washington? Perhaps it is time for a little interoperability
between the Washington bureaucrats and the troops on the ground.
II. WHY INTEROPERABILITY MATTERS
Public safety personnel respond to a wide range of events. These
events can range from a simple auto accident or fire in a residential
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outbuilding to bank robberies, multi-unit fires, and even full-scale
hurricanes. At the low end of this spectrum, a single patrol car, fire engine,
or ambulance is sufficient to handle the event. Radio is needed only to
dispatch the personnel and for the personnel to report back unusual
circumstances and resolution of the incident. For larger incidents, such as
an apartment building fire, multiple fire companies may be dispatched to
respond to the fire.
During a larger event, a strict chain of command is established at the
scene, with a single designated fire commander communicating with
subcommanders and personnel in the field (such as the burning building).
Communication is essential not only to ensure that resources are deployed
efficiently, but also to avoid uncoordinated rescue efforts which may lead
to tragic and deadly accidents. Without communications, coordination in
rescue efforts is poor to nonexistent; and the effectiveness of first
responders-while heroic-may be useless as well as endanger the lives of
others.
A real-life example illustrates the problem.' On April 20, 1999, two
students of Columbine High School in Jefferson County, Colorado, started
a shooting spree that resulted in fifteen deaths, including the shooters
themselves, and wounded dozens of others. Within minutes, local police,
firefighters, and paramedics arrived on the scene, soon to be joined by
forces from six sheriff's offices, twenty area police departments, forty-six
ambulances, and two helicopters from twelve fire and EMS agencies.
Students were streaming out of the building, there were wounded in need of
immediate medical attention, there were bombs the shooters had planted in
the building, and no one knew the status of the shooters (they had killed
themselves before the first police arrived). None of the agencies could talk
with one another over their radios, which were incompatible and
noninteroperable. Within a short time, cell phone towers were swamped
with traffic from students, parents, the press, and others and were thus
useless to first responders. The existing radio channels to communicate
with dispatch centers were overwhelmed with traffic, so there was little
awareness at dispatch of the situation at the school. The amazing thing
about the Columbine incident is that with hundreds of heavily armed and
ready-to-shoot police in a life-threatening melee in which no one knew
what others were doing, no one else was killed.
Radios used by public safety personnel do not share infrastructure
with civilian or other state or local users. A typical installation of a Land
1. This account of the response to the Columbine event is taken from the excellent
piece by Viktor Mayer-Sch6nberger, Emergency Communications: The Quest for
Interoperability in the United States and Europe, 7 INT'L J. COMM. L. & POL'Y 1, 2
(2002/2003), available at http://www.ijclp.org/7_2003/pdf/mayer-sch-ijclp-artikel.pdf.
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Mobile Radio ("LMR") system involves a number of high antennas, a
dispatch center, and mobile radios on fire trucks, patrol cars, and handheld
devices. The radios operate on dedicated frequencies assigned by the FCC;
a particularly popular frequency is 800 MHz, but many other frequency
bands are also dedicated to public safety and are used by various agencies.
Most communications transit the nearest tower; these communications may
be to and from central dispatch, or they may be among commanders and
firefighters or police on the scene. Communications via the towers may be
monitored and recorded by central dispatch for many systems. Some radios
have a "talk" or "push to talk" option, which permits direct radio-to-radio
communications without using the nearest tower. An emergency situation
is typically initiated with an alarm or a 911 call; the operator receiving the
call will route it to one or more dispatch centers. In some states, police and
fire/EMS have separate dispatchers, while in other states, a common
dispatch center is used.
In many states, the local police and fire departments have budgetary
control over their radio equipment as well as the system purchase decision.
Different radio systems, especially those using different frequency bands,
are usually not interoperable. Achieving interoperability among police, fire,
and EMS, both within an operating area and across operating areas,
requires planning and coordinated purchases and systems. Fragmented
dispatch systems often signal radio incompatibilities and
noninteroperability. The story of the response to the Columbine shootings
suggests that these incompatibilities may be the norm rather than the
exception.
III. WHO NEEDS TO INTEROPERATE, IN WHAT CASES?
In a typical interoperable system, a fire commander can request the
dispatch center to open up a channel to speak with other fire departments
that may be arriving on the scene, or to speak with police departments on
the scene. This usually is accomplished using separate channels for
command and control (speaking with other agency officers) and operational
control (speaking with persons under the direct command of the
commanders who are actually fighting the fire or dealing with a criminal
situation). Multiple channels may be put in use by the dispatch center,
depending on the needs of the situation. In order to speak across agencies,
such as fire to police, or local police to state police, the typical
interoperable system will use "mutual assistance" channels, again assigned
by the dispatch center. The general rule appears to be that the fire
commander manages the fire, and the dispatch center manages
communications.
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As noted above, for small incidents such as an auto accident or fire in
an outbuilding, the required response is an individual unit (a patrol car, an
ambulance, etc.) and interoperability is not an issue. For larger incidents
such as a home or apartment building fire, a number of fire companies may
respond, and the fire commander needs full communication capabilities
with the other fire companies to gather and maintain situational awareness
and control of his or her assets in fighting the blaze. Interoperability is
essential for efficient and effective deployment of such resources. Note that
interoperability is not appropriate for operational purposes; for example, a
firefighter in a burning building wants to talk to his or her commander and
not be bothered by nonessential police chitchat. Interoperability is
appropriate and essential at the command and control level. It is
commanders, not individual firefighters, that should be communicating
across "mutual assistance" channels. Failing this, noninteroperability
requires the use of suboptimal communication methods, such as swapping
radios or sending runners with notes.
For even larger incidents, such as a train wreck, a factory explosion,
or a school shooting, the number of responding units may be over a dozen,
drawn from different geographical regions and from different agencies. In
many cases, resources from across state lines may be required.
Additionally, state level resources may also be required: state police,
emergency management personnel, hazardous material ("hazmat") teams,
transportation engineering teams, environmental cleanup teams, etc. At this
level, the interoperability problem becomes acute, principally because there
are so many agencies to manage. While there may be communications
problems, it is perhaps more useful to think of this as a management
problem: with so many resources available, how does the field commander
manage these resources in an emergency environment? Establishing a chain
of command and adhering to it is essential, but most first responders
understand this much better than civilians. Clearly, radio communications
should facilitate this function, but radios will not solve it. Many states have
established Emergency Operations Centers ("EOCs") that take over the
dispatch and control functions for larger incidents. It is these larger
incidents in which civilian telephones, both wireline and wireless, may be
swamped with traffic and consequently useless to public safety personnel.
This occurred in the response to the Columbine shootings.
For even larger incidents, such as the World Trade Center collapse,
communications and transportation infrastructure may be destroyed, and
what is left may be overwhelmed with traffic. On 9/11, a number of
Verizon central offices were destroyed, knocking out communications to
much of lower Manhattan. While the incident may be localized, the damage
is severe enough that many units respond, and the ability to communicate
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can be severely impaired. Interoperability is imperative in these
circumstances to maintain control of the emergency response. There were
several significant breakdowns of public safety radio, particularly
concerning the New York Fire Department, and the Fire Department's
inability to interoperate with police radios received the most publicity.
More importantly, it appears that there were significant lapses in chain-of-
command protocols-as might be expected with a localized but horrific
event such as 9/11-including infrastructure damage.
At the highest level of disaster, a major hurricane such as Katrina in
2005 that devastated coastal areas of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama
(including the disastrous flooding of New Orleans) brings perspective to
emergency radio communications. During Katrina many cell towers were
blown down, and those that remained drained their emergency batteries
within hours so cellular telephones did not function.2 There were also
significant outages in wireline communications, including switching
centers. A number of emergency radio towers also collapsed; those that
remained standing served while their emergency generators maintained
power, but the fuel for these towers was exhausted within a few days.
Generally, the long-term power outages of Katrina caused significant harm
to communications among public safety personnel, including command-
and-control and situational awareness, a state of affairs that lasted weeks.
Dozens of first responders from neighboring cities, parishes, counties, and
states flooded the area to help. In addition, federal support from the
National Guard and volunteer organizations like the Red Cross were on
hand. Similar to 9/11, few agencies could speak with each other using their
radios, and the usual chaos ensued. Alabama's communications system
fared better than Mississippi's and Louisiana's, primarily because of
backup systems successfully deployed during Katrina. Unlike 9/11, the
destruction was not localized; it covered hundreds of square miles. Power
outages exacerbated the communications problems, and power took weeks
to return. The problem was not so much interoperability as operability;
radios simply did not work because of the complete failure of multiple
infrastructures.
The hierarchy described above has several dimensions: (i) number of
units responding, from one to hundreds; (ii) responders from different
geographic areas, including out of state; (iii) agencies responding (police,
fire, EMS, etc.); and (iv) jurisdiction (local, county, state, federal). As the
number of units, independent areas of origin, different types of responding
2. SELECT BIPARTISAN COMM. TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE
TO HURRICANE KATRINA, A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, H.R. REP. No. 109-377, at 167-68, 172
(2006), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/katrinareport/mainreport.pdf [hereinafter A
FAILURE OF INITIATIVE].
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agencies, and levels of jurisdiction increase, the problem migrates from
interoperability, to maintenance of chain of command, to any operability at
all. All of these dimensions impact public safety radio, and each demands
its own solution. Interoperability in the grand scheme of things is important
but by no means the only communications problem for public safety. The
tragic stories of noninteroperability that come from the 9/11 disaster seem
to have imprinted interoperability in our collective political consciousness;
but it is only one of a number of communication problems that must be
addressed if we are to ask our first responders to run into burning buildings
on our behalf.
IV. FEDERAL ACTIONS IN SUPPORT OF INTEROPERABILITY
The federal government has taken note of the problems of public
safety radio-in particular interoperability-and has not been idle. In 2004,
Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act,
3
which directed the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") and the
Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") to act promptly to:
" Develop a comprehensive, national approach for achieving
interoperability.
* Coordinate with other federal agencies.
" Establish appropriate minimum capabilities for
interoperability.
* Accelerate development of voluntary standards.
* Encourage open architecture and commercial products.
" Assist other agencies with research and development.
* Prioritize within DHS for research, development, testing and
related programs.
* Establish coordinated guidance for federal grant programs.
" Provide technical assistance.
" Develop and disseminate best practices.
* Establish performance measurements and milestones for
systematic measurement of progress.
The stated goals of coordinating, accelerating development, encouraging,
assisting, and prioritizing are no doubt laudable. However, an actual
firefighter or police officer might be excused for feeling that help is not
about to arrive any time soon upon reading these goals.
3. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458 §
7303, 118 Stat. 3638 (2004).
4. LINDA K. MOORE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PUBLIC SAFETY COMMUNICATIONS:
POLICY, PROPOSALS, LEGISLATION AND PROGRESS 7 (2005), available at http://www.fas.org/
sgp/crs/homesec/RL32594.pdf (citing Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 § 7303).
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The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 is not
the only congressional action on interoperability. The National Intelligence
and Terrorism Prevention Act confirmed the assignment by the Office of
Management and Budget to SAFECOM of overarching responsibility
within the federal government to coordinate and rationalize federal
networks and assure interoperability.5 Presently, this program is located
within the DHS Office of Interoperability and Compatibility. The following
Departments help fund SAFECOM: Justice, Treasury, Transportation,
Defense, Agriculture, Energy, Health and Human Services, and Interior. At
this time, SAFECOM does not appear to be planning a national
interoperable network.
In addition to the SAFECOM initiative, DHS, along with the
Departments of Justice and the Treasury, participate in the Integrated
Wireless Network ("IWN") program, whose goal is to develop a single
network for federal law enforcement agencies. 6 The IWN program is
targeted at achieving common systems and interoperability only among
federal law enforcement, with little or no concern for interoperability with
local, state, or regional first responders, except to note that IWN could
become a template for others to emulate, eventually becoming integrated
into a national system.7 The reader may be surprised to discover that
federal law enforcement agencies are not in fact using common
interoperable systems, even though each agency is within the White House
command structure.
Much congressional attention has been focused on the pending
transition of spectrum in the 700 MHz band, now used for UHF television,
to public safety uses. The FCC is committed, at the direction of Congress,
to relocating these television signals as part of the band-clearing for the
transition to digital broadcast TV.8 The 9/11 Commission Report identified
5. Id. at 7-8. According to its Web site, "SAFECOM is a communications program of
the Department of Homeland Security's Office for Interoperability and Compatibility that,
with its Federal partners, provides research, development, testing and evaluation, guidance,
tools, and templates on communications-related issues to local, tribal, state, and
Federal emergency response agencies." SAFECOM, Frequently Asked Questions: What is
SAFECOM?, http://www.safecomprogram.gov/SAFECOM/about/faq/ (last visited Apr. 7,
2007).
6. See Integrated Wireless Network Joint Program Office, Request for Comments on
Draft Statement of Objectives, High Level Acquisition Strategy and Phase I Advisory
Downselect Draft Evaluation Criteria 7 (July 16, 2004), http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/iwn/iwn
draft.doc.
7. MoORE, supra note 4, at 8-9.
8. See Development of Operational, Technical and Spectrum Requirements for
Meeting Federal, State and Local Public Safety Communications Requirements Through the
Year 2010, Eighth Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, WT Docket 96-86, FCC 06-34, para. 2
(Mar. 21, 2006).
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increasing the availability of spectrum to public safety as critical to solving
public safety radio difficulties.9 While the FCC plans to devote 24 MHz of
spectrum in this band to public safety communications,10 it appears the
Agency has already designated over 90 MHz to this function, 11 although it
is highly splintered and inefficiently used. However, this is not directly
related to the interoperability issue; principal attention is focused on using
this spectrum for broadband emergency uses, as discussed below.
The FCC has been active in the area of interoperability, pre-dating the
great interest generated by the failures of 9/11. In 1986, the FCC
established the National Public Safety Planning Advisory Committee to
provide the agency with recommendations concerning public safety
issues. 12 In the following year, the FCC adopted its Public Safety National
Plan, which, "among other things, established Regional Planning
Committees . . . to develop plans that met specific needs," and also
established a Public Safety National Coordinating Committee.13 Since then,
the FCC has renewed the charter of the Network Reliability and
Interoperability Council ("NRIC") (among many other advisory
committees).
Lastly, the FCC submitted its required report to Congress on public
safety radio and interoperability. 15 The focus of this report appears to be
primarily on the status of the 700 MHz band and its potential use for
broadband communications to and from first responders in emergency
situations. It includes a number of proposals from vendors as to how this
spectrum might be used for public safety.
16
The centrality of SAFECOM to the federal role in interoperability
9. NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT 397 (2004), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/91 1/pdf/sec 12.pdf.
10. See FCC, 700 MHz Public Safety Spectrum, http://www.fcc.gov/pshs/spectrum/700
mhz/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2007).
11. See Spectrum for Pub. Safety Users: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce,
Science, and Transp., 108th Cong. (2004) (testimony of Michael K. Powell, Chairman,
FCC), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.
Testimony&Hearing_ID=1300&WitnessID=1943.
12. See MOORE, supra note 4, at 24.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. FCC, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE STUDY TO ASSESS SHORT-TERM AND LONG-
TERM NEEDS FOR ALLOCATIONS OF ADDITIONAL PORTIONS OF THE ELECTROMAGNETIC
SPECTRUM FOR FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROVIDERS (2005),
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-262865A 1.
16. There are numerous other federal agencies involved in public safety interoperability
which are not covered in this Article, such as the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration ("NTIA") in the Department of Commerce and the Department
of Justice's ("DOJ's") Advanced Generation of Interoperability Law Enforcement
("AGILE") program.
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suggests a further look at its activities. Within six months of its October
2001 establishment in the Department of Treasury, SAFECOM was moved
to the Federal Emergency Management Agency ("FEMA") with a change
of management team. Within another six months, FEMA again changed
SAFECOM's management team. Six months afterwards, DHS was
appointed managing partner and installed yet another management team.
One year later, the General Accounting Office ("GAO") conducted a
review of SAFECOM, finding that "[w]hile its overall objective of
achieving communications interoperability among emergency response
entities at all levels of government is a challenging task that will take many
years to fully accomplish, Project SAFECOM, in its 2 year history, has
made very limited progress in addressing this objective."'
With all the advisory committees, legislative mandates, the
involvement of many agencies, coordinating, prioritizing, advising,
developing, and monitoring, it may come as a surprise that nothing seems
to have actually happened. Not only has the federal government seemed to
have little (or no) impact on interoperability for state, local, and regional
first responders, it appears they have had as yet no impact on
interoperability for their own federal law enforcement agencies. It is not as
if we do not know the dimensions of the interoperability problem. The
GAO laid out the problems (and lack of progress towards solving them) to
Congress in 2003.18 Apparently, the need for coordination, planning,
staffing, and funding, as well as strong support from Congress and the
Administration, have proven insurmountable obstacles, at least as the GAO
sees it.
But perhaps a more decentralized approach might work, one in which
the federal government acts as a facilitator, working to define and develop
standards, and making grants to states and municipalities that conform to
those standards-in other words, a more federalist approach in which the
heavy lifting is in the hands of the states and municipalities, and the federal
government provides funding and technical guidance. While one might
think this is exactly what the federal government is doing, this is not the
case.
Between September 11, 2001 and July 30, 2004, DHS provided over
$5.4 billion to states for public safety radio, with Administration
17. GAO, PROJECT SAFECOM: KEY CROSS-AGENCY EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS
EFFORT REQUIRES STRONGER COLLABORATION (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new
.items/d04494.pdf.
18. Homeland Security: Challenges in Achieving Interoperable Communications for
First Responders, Testimony Before the Subcomms. of the H. Gov 't Reform Comm., 108th
Cong. (2003) (statement of William 0. Jenkins, Jr., Dir., Homeland Security & Just. Issues),
available at http://gao.gov/new.items/d04231 t.pdf.
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appropriations of $200 million specifically earmarked for
interoperability. At first blush, it would appear that the above-mentioned
model is exactly what the DHS has in mind. DHS has established the
standard setting function in its directorate of Science & Technology
("S&T"). It has also established the grant-making function for equipment
for local and state agencies in its Office of Domestic Preparedness
("ODP"). According to a recent report of the DHS Office of Inspector
General, S&T has produced twelve standards, but none are related to
• .. 20
interoperability. Further, adhering to these standards is not a condition of
receiving DHS money from ODP. In fact, S&T is not consistently
informing ODP what standards it has set and for what equipment. While it
is laudable that DHS is indeed making grants to states and municipalities, it
is disheartening that the standards process is apparently not linked to
equipment grantmaking, and that none of the standards relate to
interoperability. 
2 1
Perhaps even more disheartening is to learn that in at least one case in
which communications infrastructure became central to saving lives,
federal grant money seems to have fallen into a black hole. Between 2003
and 2005, Louisiana received $23,495,114 in federal grant money for
public safety communications; the City of New Orleans received
$5,510,412 in 2003 specifically for achieving interoperability. At the time
of Katrina, less than five percent of this grant had been spent.2 2 Since the
entire public safety system collapsed during Katrina, one might wonder
exactly where the $23 million went.
If the GAO diagnosis is to be believed, the need for coordination,
support, funding, and other interbureaucracy warfare is getting in the way
of progress. This might suggest a more direct and more top-down approach
might succeed. Perhaps if Congress and the Administration designate a
specific department with full responsibility for public safety radio and
interoperability, with large amounts of money, the latest technology, and
the authority to mandate that all first responders comply with its systems,
19. Press Release, Dep't of Homeland Sec., Fact Sheet: RapidCom 9/30 and
Interoperability Progress (July 30, 2004), http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press
release 0470.shtm.
20. The standards cover personal protective and detection equipment. See DEP'T OF
HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., REVIEW OF DHS' PROGRESS IN ADOPTING AND
ENFORCING EQUIPMENT STANDARDS FOR FIRST RESPONDERS 2 (2006), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_06-30_Mar6.pdf.
21. Numerous federal agencies make grants for emergency radio services, yet most fire
and police departments remain unaware of what is available. See WILLIAM L. PESSEMIER,
Top PRIORITY: A FIRE SERVICE GUIDE TO INTEROPERABLE COMMUNICATIONS 5-6 (2006),
available at http://www.interoperability.virginia.gov/pdfs/FireService-InteropHandbook.
pdf.
22. A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 2, at 175.
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progress would be forthcoming. Yet, based on present evidence, cutting
through interagency dithering and bureaucracy still does not seem to do the
trick.
We do indeed have a model for such a top-down, all-the-money-you-
need approach in developing advanced radio systems. It is the Defense
Department's Joint Tactical Radio System ("JTRS"), a project started in
1997 to provide the U.S. military with integrated fully interoperable radio
systems that could operate from multiple platforms in combat conditions,
using the most advanced technology, such as software-defined radio. 23 In
2003, the project was very far off its trajectory, both cost-wise and
performance-wise; it appeared to be in meltdown. The GAO issued an
unflattering report on the management failures of the project, discussing its
unstable requirements, immature technologies, overly aggressive schedules,24
and costly overruns. As a result of this review, a number of management
25
changes were introduced in the JTRS project. A more recent GAO report
lauded these changes but concluded that the basic problems of the project
have yet to be solved.26 If any radio project could be more important than
public safety radio, it is military radio, where not only life but national
security is on the line. Yet a highly centralized and integrated approach has
achieved little more than our current public safety efforts, except to spend
vastly more money (current estimate for JTRS is $37 billion). 27 On the
basis of the history of JTRS, it would appear implausible that a similar
program designed to standardize public safety radio and achieve
interoperability based on advanced technology is unlikely to perform much
better than the current desultory federal interoperability "program."
Based on these findings, it is difficult to reject the cynical hypothesis
that the federal government engages in energetic to-ing and fro-ing to
demonstrate its commitment to satisfying a political demand for reliable
and ubiquitous public safety radio, but it is in reality a very low priority, so
nothing actually gets done. It would appear that our public policy
community is quite content with allowing our police to come under fire
from bad guys and our firefighters to run into burning buildings without the
best equipment to save their lives and the lives of others. Fixing this
apparently is not high on anyone's agenda.
23. GAO, CHALLENGES AND RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH THE JOINT TACTICAL RADIO
SYSTEM PROGRAM, GAO 03-879R, at 1 (2003), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03879r.pdf.
24. GAO, DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: RESTRUCTURED JTRS PROGRAM REDUCES RISK BUT
SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGES REMAIN, GAO 06-955, at 1 (2006), http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d06955.pdf
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 2.
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One bright spot in the federal arena is DHS's SAFECOM project.
Although SAFECOM has been given impossibly grand objectives and little
power to achieve them, it has focused on working closely with states,
helping them with interoperability plans, helping them apply for federal
grants, reporting to them on progress, and generally being helpful.
SAFECOM has opted to focus on the action at the state level and to aid and
support that action. It has modest but very useful objectives, which it
actually seems to be achieving.
28
V. Is THERE No HOPE? WHAT ARE THE STATES DOING?
Despite this shameful disarray within our federal government, states
and municipalities are not helpless, confused, or unable to act to solve this
problem. In fact, many states have moved aggressively on interoperability,
having either already achieved it or making quick progress toward it. The
following abbreviated list of states and their programs 29 gives a more
optimistic picture than at the federal level:
The Commonwealth of Virginia and SAFECOM have entered into a
partnership premised upon applying SAFECOM principles in an effort to
plan and implement statewide communications interoperability.
Indiana's Integrated Public Safety Commission was established by the
Governor's office; it oversees Project Hoosier SAFE-T, which is the state's
interoperability program.
Oregon's governor created the State Interoperability Executive
Council in 2002; its role is to provide policy level direction for matters
related to planning, designing and implementing guidelines, best practices,
and standard approaches to address Oregon's public safety communications
interoperability issues.
In Tennessee, the Mobile Communications Alliance Team was
created to provide direction in the areas of planning, designing, funding,
implementing, and governing for a shared communications system.
Alaska is still at the planning stage; a governance structure, the
Alaska Land Mobile Radio Executive Council, was formed.
Mississippi created an incident command system in 2001, as well as
the formation of a State Interoperability Executive Committee in 2003,
28. The SAFECOM Web site provides useful information documenting their support of
the states. It is revealing that the Web sites of most states with active interoperability
programs link to the SAFECOM Web site and documents but not to sites of other federal
programs. See SAFECOM, Welcome to SAFECOM, http://www.safecomprogram.
gov/SAFECOM/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2007).
29. See SAFECOM, REVIEW OF STATEWIDE INTEROPERABILITY PLANNING EFFORTS
ACROSS THE COUNTRY, http://www.interoperability.virginia.gov/pdfs/SAFECOM-
VAResearchReport.pdf. Links to individual state Web sites describing program efforts in
those states can be found at the end of this Article.
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setting the state on a path to dramatically improve the response,
communications, and coordination of first responders. These efforts have
been reinforced by Hurricane Katrina.
New York has addressed its interoperability problem with the
development of a Statewide Wireless Network ("SWN"). The SWN
incorporates new infrastructure, which allows for gateways and interfaces
to other public safety/service communication systems. However, there is no
financial support for local systems.
A South Dakota interoperability system was funded entirely with
grants and legislative appropriations. Because of this comprehensive
funding, the system does not assess user fees, and a yearly budget is only
needed for maintenance. The system supports about ninety-five percent of
all public safety agencies in the state, and this, coupled with the lack of
user fees, allows for the greatest possible local participation. This system
appears to be fully operational, providing full interoperability among public
safety agencies at the state and local level.
Maryland designed an Incident Management Interoperable
Communications System. The system would only be intended for operation
during mutual-aid or catastrophic incidents, not day-to-day interoperability
use. The participants are local law enforcement, federal agencies, state
police, fire departments, EMS, Department of Natural Resources, and the
State Highway Department.
Pennsylvania's legislature has cautiously moved ahead with planning,
but it is under substantial budgetary pressure.
Florida has also faced budgetary pressures, and it is moving ahead
with various public-private programs in a five-step process.
Texas' Interagency Radio Work Group of Texas ("IRWG") works in
cooperation with the Texas First Responder Preparedness Program. The
IRWG is an informal group of representatives from state agencies and
affiliated public safety associations chartered to promote interoperability
and improve public safety communications statewide.
Missouri has urged public safety officials to look beyond traditional
sources of public safety funding and seek opportunities such as private
donors, corporations, foundations, or trusts to fund their interoperable
communications program.
In addition, California, Oregon, Washington, Nebraska, and Montana
are in various stages of planning and implementing interoperability plans.
VI. CASE STUDY: DELAWARE
In all the above-mentioned readings, reports, reviews, and proposals,
we hear the voices of the federal bureaucrats, but we do not hear the voices
of those who really matter: individual police officers, firefighters, or EMS
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providers. While the Author has done time in Washington and is certainly
familiar with the paper deluge, the absence of input from those who put
their lives at risk for us seems particularly inappropriate.
To rectify this, I sought out first responders near my home in Sussex
County, Delaware. Sussex County is the most rural of Delaware's three
counties, the others being New Castle (urbanized) and Kent (location of the
state government). Delaware is an unremarkable state; it is not where
Americans look to see their future (that would be California) nor to seek
fame and fortune (that would be New York or Hollywood). The median
income is slightly above the national average, and local taxes fall rather
below the national average.
Sussex Countians love their firefighters. In many small settlements
throughout the rural county, the fire hall is by far the largest building in
town, often a brick building with six to eight truck bays. Staffed entirely by
volunteers, Sussex fire companies have equipment that would be the envy
of any big city fire department. Most EMS operations are carried out by
fire companies. The position of firefighter is well-respected within the
community. Further, fire companies are quite close to each other, even in
rural areas. The Millville Fire Company is responsible for our home and
has fire companies five miles southwest (Roxana), seven miles northwest
(Dagsboro), and three miles east (Bethany Beach). All Sussex County fire,
police, and EMS are dispatched via the central dispatch center in
Georgetown, 31 the county seat.
In 1993, the State of Delaware purchased an 800 MHz digital trunked
radio system from Motorola, built to Association of Public-Safety
Communications Officials ("APCO") twenty-five standards. 32 The state
accepted the system in all counties by the end of 1998, and the systems
went live. After Motorola made required connectivity improvements, the
system received final acceptance in 2001. This system is now in use by
every police department, fire company, and EMS unit in the state of
Delaware, as well as state and county government agencies, such as the
state Department of Transportation ("DelDOT"), Department of Natural
30. Delaware almost never appears in the national news; a 2002 news story noted that a
giant iceberg had broken free of the Ross Ice Shelf in Antarctica (named C19) and that it
was larger than the entire state of Delaware. New Antarctic Iceberg Bigger Than Delaware,
CNN.coM, May 15, 2002, http://archives.cnn.com/2002/TECH/science/05/14/large.iceberg/.
Besides iceberg comparisons, national references to Delaware are rather sparse, confirming
its unremarkability.
31. For legacy reasons, both Seaford and Rehoboth Beach dispatch their own public
safety personnel, in fill cooperation with Georgetown.
32. State Div. of Commc'ns, State of Delaware Digital 800 MHz Statewide Trunked
Radio System, http://www.state.de.us/pscomm/800mhzradio system.htm. This Web site
provides more information on details of tower location and characteristics as well as efforts
to interoperate with regions in other states close to Delaware's border with Maryland.
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Resources and Environmental Control ("DNREC"), State Police, and
Delaware Emergency Management Agency ("DEMA"). Additionally,
hospital emergency rooms throughout the state are equipped with
compatible radios. The system is controlled from three dispatch centers,
one in each county.
In September 2006, I conducted an extensive interview with the
Assistant Chief of the Millville Fire Company, Doug Scott, who generously
shared with me his time and his extensive practical knowledge of the field
operation of the state's 800 MHz radio system, from the point of view of
someone who must command firefighters to run into burning buildings. At
the level of a major fire incident, there is no planning, prioritizing,
coordinating, staff analysis, or program development. Radio systems either
work or they do not work; fires extinguished and lives saved, or not.
During our interview, Doug Scott was informative, helpful, measured, and
quite undramatic in his mien, but it soon became clear that I was getting a
report from a career under live ammunition, where communications can
mean the difference between life and death. Nothing could be further from
a career of federal bureaucracy. What follows is my reporting of that
interview.
A. Results in Brief
The Delaware 800 MHz digital system provides first responders voice
communications anywhere in the state, with the ability to communicate
easily among any number of fire companies. The system also permits
interoperability among fire, local police, EMS personnel, hospital
emergency rooms, state police, DEMA, DelDOT, DNREC, and other state
agencies. Most communications are routed through the appropriate dispatch
centers, where they are recorded. In the event that first responders are out
of contact with the system's towers, their radios can go direct radio-to-
radio over a limited range. The system permits all the communications
Doug Scott needs when on call.
B. Typical Fire Incident
When a 911 call is received, the dispatch center determines the nature
of the call and what services are needed: police, fire, and/or EMS. The fire
company is alerted by radio and by an annunciator board in the fire hall.
The dispatch radio channel is usually one-way (unless there is a dire
emergency) as dispatch communicates with all fire and EMS units
simultaneously within Sussex County. Police have their own dispatch
channels. Within minutes, firefighters don their turn-out gear, and the
engines are rolling. Each engine has an onboard laptop computer, in which
street maps and building plans are stored, so the engine crew can find its
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way to the fire and knows what to expect in the building (for example, if it
is a commercial, multistory building). If the fire is major, other companies
are dispatched to the fire. Generally, the ranking officer of the first
company to arrive is the Fire Commander. He or she establishes radio
communication with the firefighters under his or her command.
C. Interoperability with Other Fire Companies
The radio system has five banks of radio channels, sixteen channels
per bank. Sussex County has its own bank, split among East, Central, and
West Sussex, but all channels are accessible from all radios. Millville
generally uses the Fire 2 channel for operational control; this is the channel
that the Millville Fire Commander uses to communicate with his or her
men and women. Personnel are organized by crew, each crew with three
persons, one radio per crew. If the fire is sufficiently large, other companies
will show up and ask the Fire Commander for instructions. Nearby fire
companies who typically support Millville know from experience that they
must use Fire 2. If more companies are called, the dispatch center may
assign the channels to each company as they are on their way to the fire.
The Commander allocates one fire channel for command and control: this
is the channel over which he or she speaks to chiefs of other companies
under his or her command at the fire. Individual firefighters do not hear this
channel.
EMS personnel have their own channels, EMS-2, EMS-3, and EMS-
4, with which to communicate with each other and with the dispatch center.
These channels are also available on all radios. There are also a number of
statewide channels: 911HELP (available nationwide on any 800 MHz
system), Statewide Fire, and Statewide EMS. These channels have been
used when Sussex County sent rescue boats to New Castle County to help
in flood relief.
Additionally, any company can switch to a "Talk" channel (Talk 1,
Talk 2) which is a radio-to-radio channel that does not use the 800 MHz
towers. This frees up Fire 2 for command and control. It is essential that
operational channels not be cluttered with excess traffic. Every firefighter
at the incident hears every call on the operational channel, including the
commander, and so is knowledgeable about what is going on in his or her
situation. They do not need to hear what is going on elsewhere, and such
traffic simply clutters up the channel. The Fire Commander uses the
command and control channel to communicate with other chiefs at the
incident to coordinate activities and share information.
Key to effective firefighting, indeed all of emergency management, is
"situational awareness;" the Fire Commander and all firefighters need to
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have the best and most complete information about what is happening.
33
Open communications is the only way to accomplish this goal. Any
information picked up by one firefighter on the scene is transmitted over
the operational channel and relayed to the Fire Commander.
Interoperability is key to situational awareness; in order for the Fire
Commander to best deploy the resources at hand, he or she must have the
most recent and complete information as possible. As many eyes and ears
must contribute to that knowledge via communications.
D. Interoperability with Other Agencies
An important part of both situational awareness and the ability to
command and control is interoperability with other agencies, such as police
and EMS. In this situation, the dispatch center, upon request of either
agency, permits use of Mutual Assistance channels (available statewide),
MA-i or MA-2, in which agencies can speak with each other, that is,
interoperate. Additionally, there are four International Tactical Channels
("ITAC") which operate radio-to-radio (similar to the Talk channels), by
which police, fire, and EMS can speak with each other. Again, situational
awareness and the ability to coordinate command and control are well
served by this interoperability.
E. Interoperability with Other States
Sussex County borders Ocean City, Maryland, as well as Worcester
County, Maryland, and each area often finds itself responding to calls
across the state line. The current 800 MHz system interoperates with both
Ocean City and Worcester County agencies, even though the Maryland
agencies use GE rather than Motorola equipment.
F. Interoperability with Federal Agencies
Law enforcement officials are sometimes required to operate
cooperatively with the FBI, DEA, ATF, and FEMA. Fire companies have
much less need to cooperate with federal agencies, except perhaps FEMA
during disasters.34 Doug Scott's expectation was that all communications
with FEMA would be channeled through DEMA, so the command and
communication structure would remain intact. However, this link had never
33. The fundamental emergency management failures at the World Trade Center on
9/11, the Columbine High School shootings, and Hurricane Katrina were the inability to
maintain situational awareness and command and control of emergency resources due to a
lack of communications operability or interoperability.
34. ATF agents have a forensic responsibility to investigate fatal fires. However, their
role is investigative, and they show up after the fire, so there is no need to integrate them
into the communications command structure.
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been exercised and there was not much concern about it. I can only
conjecture that the men and women who protect our lives are not counting
on significant federal help to perform their jobs (other than receiving a
federal grant).
G. Delaware Summary
The function of public responder radio is to enable the Commander
on the scene to maintain situational awareness, to control his or her
operational resources, and to command other companies and agencies
assisting at the scene. Failure to master these basic communication
functions severely impairs the effectiveness of response and the ability to
save lives, as illustrated in the earlier example of the Columbine High
School shootings. By all accounts, Delaware has been able to put a system
in the hands of its first responders which meets these objectives; field
personnel have had this system in place for almost ten years, and are both
knowledgeable and comfortable using this system. It supports full
interoperability with local and state authorities and interoperability across
state boundaries where such cooperation is mutually beneficial.
VII. CONCLUSION
There is a huge disconnect between federal level activities, in which
almost nothing real is happening, and states such as Delaware, in which the
interoperability problems have been solved. Federal grants are welcome,
but the track record of effective deployment of grant money is spotty at
best. SAFECOM has been helpful in a number of states, such as Virginia,
and is responsible for what little positive progress has been made at the
federal level.
Delaware, an otherwise unremarkable state, has clearly demonstrated
that the interoperability problem is easily solved with existing, well-
established technology. Delaware is not a particularly wealthy state, so
solving the problem cannot have been an insuperable financial burden, as
other states have claimed. The initiative is with the states. Those states who
muster the political will to properly equip their first responders have a clear
path to follow, possibly with federal grants and/or advice, possibly without.
This is a well-understood technology in which a number of states have
much experience that they are willing to share with others.
Federal institutions seem to have an inflated concept of their potential
value added in public safety radio and a significant undervaluation of what
states can and have accomplished. States may look to the federal agencies
for grant money, but it is very doubtful that they are looking to the federal
government for leadership. The federal agencies, far from being the leaders
they aspire to be, are at best playing "catch-up." One might think that
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communications integration for the military and for federal law
enforcement might be the first item on the federal agenda; so far, they have
not shown they can handle these tasks, much less lead anyone else. If and
when communications integration arrives in the public safety sphere, it will
arrive by the federal agencies adapting to existing state systems, not by
states being forced into federally mandated standards and practices they do
not need. Some initiatives of SAFECOM have taken on this much more
modest role of supporting the states in their own initiatives and have had
some success.
In fact, the case for common standards and equipment across all
public safety radio in the U.S. seems weak. Delaware and Maryland have
demonstrated that when states need to work together, they can do so
without help from the federal agencies. In cases of major disasters, such as
Hurricane Katrina, federal agencies do indeed flood into the affected
region, along with first responders from across the country. However, in
such cases the problems of emergency management include chain of
command problems, resource availability, command of resources, and
operability of any communications systems. Interoperability is a second-
order effect in such situations.35 It appears the best strategy for FEMA and
other federal agencies is to adapt their systems to that of the individual
states in order to handle the relatively few times that interoperability
between federal and local/state personnel is required.
35. See infra, app.
The sheer force of Hurricane Katrina disabled many of the communications
systems that state and local authorities and first responders rely upon to
communicate with each other and with FEMA. This was not an issue of
interoperability, but of basic operability resulting from wind, flooding, loss of
power, and other damage to infrastructure.
Hurricane Katrina. The Role of the Department of Homeland Security: Hearing Before the
H. Spec. Comm. on Katrina, 109th Cong. 5 (2005) (statement of Michael Chertoff,
Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security), http://katrina.house.gov/
hearings/10 1905/chertoffstate 10 1905.DOC.
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VIII. APPENDIX
A. Public Safety Communications in Katrina-Class Disasters
It is apparent from the Katrina experience that public safety
communications collapsed far more seriously than on 9/11. The reason was
a collapse of the power system, which was not functional for several weeks
in large parts of Louisiana and Mississippi, and flooding of a substantial
portion of the communications infrastructure generally, coupled with the
inability to move supplies (such as diesel fuel for backup generators at
radio towers) reliably over the road system.
There are two solutions to this problem. The first is that 800 MHz
digital systems already have "Talk" channels that do not transit the towers
and are thus not dependent on the tower infrastructure. These systems are
in use today and are interoperable. Achieving fully efficient use of these
systems would be difficult in the event communication with the dispatch
centers is lost. The second is outfitting first responders with satellite phones
in sufficient quantities to handle a Katrina-class disaster. This requires not
only the phones themselves but training first responders how to use the
phones and how they fit into the command structure. This is one area in
which federal support could be effective. The coverage area of a satellite is
quite large, and federally funded satellite capacity committed to public
safety (possibly bandwidth normally for commercial use that public safety
could preempt if needed) would be very useful, together with standard
settings. Perhaps we would then see the private sector design and build
satellite radio systems for public safety use. An essential component of
using satellite phones as a disaster backup is training in both readiness and
operational use.
B. New Technologies for Public Safety Communications
Public safety communications is primarily oriented to voice. For law
enforcement use, in-car radios are also used to access and display records
(such as criminal files and motor vehicle records) and display graphics
(such as photographs). Recent interest in the 700 MHz spectrum (if and
when the current TV licensees are relocated) in public safety has focused
on the provision of broadband capabilities to the field. Applications
mentioned are live-feed video and transmission of maps and building plans,
among others. The pitch to devote this spectrum to broadband has been
from the radio vendors, each of which has its favorite plan. How broadband
would be used in the field is another matter, and we have yet to see a
compelling business case for this. During my interview with the Assistant
Chief of the Millville Fire Company, there was no interest expressed in live
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video feeds, and indeed it is difficult to imagine how this might be useful in
general fire use. There was more interest in the transmission of maps and
building plans. Doug Scott today collects maps from the county as well as
maps of new developments as builders complete them. He also has building
plans on file on the few multistory buildings in the Millville area. He. sees
that all maps are easily accessible on the onboard computers on each
engine and truck available in the field. He expressed interest in having this
available via broadband radio directly from the county, and therefore saw a
need for such a broadband service.
However, the need to receive up to the minute maps and plans would
seem limited to geographic areas in which there is ongoing construction or
renovations of existing properties (such as Sussex County), so that maps or
plans over, say, one week old could be out of date. In slower-growing
areas, updating fire companies' maps is probably unnecessary more than
once every six months, in which case distributing maps via CD rather than
real-time radio is more efficient and effective.
Recently, some prominent commentators36 have suggested that public
safety communications problems could be solved using Wi-Fi-like radio
networks which are "meshed," in which each radio can act as a relay point
for messages, sending messages from one radio or antenna to another until
it arrives at its destination, much as the Internet delivers its content. Such
proposals are often couched in terminology suggesting that a quick trip to
one's local Radio Shack will produce all the gear one needs to set up such a
system. In fact, there are currently no commercial mesh network systems
deployed and operational, and the equipment is not available at Radio
Shack or any other commercial electronics store. Further, even under ideal
conditions, mesh networks require a rather high density of phones and relay
points to work successfully. In the event of a hurricane, it is likely that
outdoor access points will be blown away just as other antennas are blown
away, and such a system would often not be able to garner the critical mass
needed to sustain mesh communications. Perhaps someday this might be a
solution, but we are very far from such a network being feasible, 37 and
36. See generally Carl Malamud & Reed Hundt, A Better Communications System for
Emergency Workers, CTR. FOR AMER. PROGRESS, Sept. 9, 2005, http://www.americanprogre
ss.org/issues/2005/09/b 1029179.html.
37. Immediately after Hurricane Katrina, a group of firms including Intel, US Wireless,
MCI, Skytel, and Tropos Networks deployed thirteen Tropos MetroMesh networks in the
City of New Orleans, using WiMax and directional Wi-Fi access points. Since these
antennas were deployed after the hurricane, there was no risk of wind damage to them (as
would be the case if they were deployed before the hurricane), and the installation was quite
customized and unique to the situation at hand. See Press Release, Tropos Networks, Intel,
MCI, SkyTel and US Wireless Use MetroMesh in Assisting Gulf Coast to Re-establish
Communications Networks in the Wake of Hurricane Katrina, (Sept. 19, 2005),
http://www.tropos.com/newsletters/2005-09-19.php.
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certainly not in life-threatening situations. Technophiles pushing their
favorite gizmo hoping the public safety folks will actually use it are close
to irresponsible. Pushing one's agenda of untried systems into the
emergency communications area is foolhardy in the extreme.
Focusing the discussion on flashy new technology misses the point; if
interoperability is the problem, we have the technology for the solution
well in hand and have had it in hand for twenty years. While new
technology may eventually produce something useful to help the police
officer during a drug raid or a firefighter inside a burning building, whizzy
new gear is simply an answer looking for a public safety question that no
one has asked.
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